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Did Doubling Reserve Requirements Cause the Recession of 1937-1938? 
A Microeconomic Approach 






In 1936-37, the Federal Reserve doubled the reserve requirements imposed on member banks.  Ever 
since, the question of whether the doubling of reserve requirements increased reserve demand and 
produced a contraction of money and credit, and thereby helped to cause the recession of 1937-1938, 
has been a matter of controversy. Using microeconomic data to gauge the fundamental reserve 
demands of Fed member banks, we find that despite being doubled, reserve requirements were not 
binding on bank reserve demand in 1936 and 1937, and therefore could not have produced a significant 
contraction in the money multiplier. To the extent that increases in reserve demand occurred from 1935 
to 1937, they reflected fundamental changes in the determinants of reserve demand and not changes in 
reserve requirements.  
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  Today, U.S. banks hold roughly a trillion dollars in excess reserves. The potential for those excess 
reserves to fuel a future expansion of money and credit, and possibly an acceleration of inflation, is a 
concern being voiced by many observers who are encouraging the Federal Reserve (Fed) to be ready to 
respond to such an expansion. This policy question today is closely related to monetary policy actions by 
the Fed in the 1930s. In 1936 and early 1937, in response to high levels of excess reserves, the Federal 
Reserve doubled the minimum reserve balances that member banks were required to hold with the Fed 
as a proportion of their deposits. In May 1937, a recession began. As a result, many commentators 
(most notably, Friedman and Schwartz, 1963) since that time have linked the onset of the recession to a 
tightening of monetary policy, of which the doubling of reserve requirements was a major component. 
Friedman and Schwartz contend that the increase in reserve requirements caused banks’ reserve 
demands to rise, reducing the amount of deposits and credit that could be built upon the existing 
monetary base. 
  Although widely accepted, the Friedman and Schwartz (1963) view of the origins of the 
recession of 1937-1938 has been challenged. Other policies – tax rate increases in 1936 (Romer 1992, 
Calomiris and Hubbard 1995) and the sterilization of gold inflows beginning in December 1936 – also 
preceded the recession of 1937-1938, and have been recognized as important contributors to the 
economic contraction. Some authors – notably Hanes (2006) – argue on the basis of time series analysis 
that the changes in reserve requirements had no discernible effect on bond yields. Nonetheless, the 
Friedman and Schwartz (1963) interpretation remains widely accepted among economists, 
policymakers, and textbook authors (e.g., Romer, 1992, 2009;  Mishkin, 1989, pp. 399-400).  
  In this paper, we take a microeconomic approach to gauging the effects of doubling reserve 




and thereby were a likely cause of the recession of 1937-1938. If the increase in reserve requirements 
reduced the supplies of credit and money, they would have done so by increasing the demand of Fed 
member banks for reserves. We estimate the demand of Fed member banks for reserves during this 
period to gauge whether the increase in reserve requirements increased reserve demand, and through 
that increase, caused a reduction in the supplies of credit and money. We find that reserve 
requirements were not binding on bank reserve demand, and thus the increase in reserve requirements 
had little if any effect on the money multiplier and the supplies of money and credit. 
  Section II provides a review of the literature. Section III lays out the theoretical basis for our 
empirical approach. Section IV describes the paths of required, excess, and total reserves, by bank type 
and location, for various reserve concepts. Section V describes our microeconomic data. Section VI 
presents our estimation results for reserve demand in the absence of increases in reserve requirements. 
Section VII uses those estimates to simulate the level of reserves held by banks in the absence of any 
reserve requirement increases in 1936 and 1937, and shows that there is no residual amount of 
increased reserve demand attributable to the increases in reserve requirements. Section VIII concludes 
by considering the implications of our findings for monetary policy today, given the high levels of excess 
reserves currently in the banking system. 
II. Literature Review 
The Banking Act of 1935 expanded the Federal Reserve’s authority to set the reserve 
requirements imposed on the System’s member banks. The Fed subsequently doubled requirements to 
their legal maximum rates in three steps in August 1936, March 1937, and May 1937 (see Table 1). The 
Fed took this action primarily in response to a rapid and large increase in reserve balances in excess of 
legal requirements, which Fed officials viewed as posing a potential inflation threat that could derail the 




policy from the Treasury and to make the Fed’s traditional policy tools—the discount rate and open-
market operations—relevant and effective. The Fed viewed the significant slack in excess reserves as 
undermining the effectiveness of its other tools (See Friedman and Schwartz, 1963, pp. 520-22; Meltzer, 
2003, pp. 495-500). Finally, the use of the reserve requirement as a policy tool reflected the loss of 
control by the Fed over the monetary base after 1935. The newly created monetary powers of the 
Treasury (the Exchange Stabilization Fund and the power to set the price of gold and thereby determine 
the size of gold inflows, established in 1934 and 1933, respectively) gave the Treasury effective control 
over the supply of high-powered money. The capacity of the Treasury to increase the monetary base 
was greater than the capacity of the Fed to reduce it, and Secretary Morgenthau recognized and used 
that strategic advantage to exert control over the Fed’s monetary policy (Calomiris and Wheelock 1998; 
Meltzer 2003; Calomiris 2010). The Fed engaged in almost no open-market operations over the period 
1935-1941. The power to set reserve requirements, and thereby potentially to influence the money 
multiplier, however, remained with the Fed. 
Fed officials did not view the increases in reserve requirement in 1936 and 1937 as a tightening 
of monetary policy. Rather, they viewed excess reserves as “superfluous” balances, and expected that 
the increases in reserve requirements would have little or no impact on interest rates or credit supply 
(Meltzer, 2003, pp. 495-96). Their goal was not to tighten monetary conditions, but to put the Fed into a 
position to either tighten or ease policy later using open-market operations and changes in the discount 
rate. By contrast, Friedman and Schwartz (1963) contend that the increases in reserve requirements 
substantially reduced money stock growth and were a main cause of the recession of 1937-38, and their 
view has remained widely accepted. 
Friedman and Schwartz (1963) argue that the hikes in reserve requirements were contractionary 




multiplier. The familiar Friedman-Schwartz monetary decomposition defines the money stock (M) as a 
function of the monetary base (“high-powered money”) and a multiplier determined by the public’s 
relative holdings of currency and bank deposits (C/D), and the ratio of bank reserves to deposits (R/D). 
Total bank reserves, in turn, can be written as the sum of required reserves (RR) and reserves held in 
excess of legal requirements (ER). Hence,  
(1)     M = D + C 
(2)     Base = R + C 
(3)     M = (Base) x [(1 + C/D) / (RR/D + ER/D + C/D)]. 
Thus, the money stock (M) is mechanically related to reserve requirements, which determine the ratio 
RR/D; hence, all else equal, an increase in reserve requirements will reduce the money stock.  
From the perspective of this calculation, the key issue is whether the ratio of excess reserves to 
deposits is sensitive to a change in reserve requirements. If the demand for total reserves (for managing 
portfolio risk and liquidity risk) is sufficiently high (see, for example, Calomiris and Wilson 2004), then 
even a large increase in a non-binding reserve requirement will have no effect on the demand for total 
reserves. In that case, a change in required reserves will have no effect on the money multiplier. 
Friedman and Schwartz (1963) contend that the three increases in reserve requirements in 
1936-37 produced a decline in the money stock that, in turn, caused the recession of 1937-38. Figure 1 
plots the level of the money stock, the monetary base, and the ratios of bank deposits to reserves and 
bank deposits to currency. The months in which the three increases in reserve requirements took effect 
are indicated by vertical lines.  
The money stock rose steadily between 1934 and early 1937. According to Friedman and 




of money stock growth were a growing monetary base, caused mainly by a growing monetary gold 
stock, and a rising ratio of bank deposits to currency, i.e., inverse of C/D. By contrast, the ratio of 
deposits to reserves, i.e., the inverse of R/D, generally fell and, all else equal, would have caused the 
money stock to fall. The ratio of deposits to reserves continued to fall after the first increase in reserve 
requirements in August 1936 through December of that year. According to Friedman and Schwartz 
(1963, p. 526), “[T]he increase in reserve requirements did have important current effects. … [F]rom the 
end of July to the end of December 1936, the ratio of deposits to bank reserves declined sharply as 
banks sought to restore their excess reserve positions. In consequence, although high-powered money 
grew by decidedly more in those five months than in the prior seven months, the stock of money grew 
by less than half as much.” 
Friedman and Schwartz (1963, p. 804) measure monthly changes in the ratio of deposits to 
reserves, which was generally declining throughout the second half of the 1930s. The ratio of deposits to 
reserves reached a peak in June 1936, regaining its March 1935 level after having fallen to a local 
minimum in January 1936. It then declined from June to November 1936, and remained fairly stable 
from October 1936 until November 1937 (varying between 4.93 and 5.12), and was nearly constant 
(varying between 4.96 and 4.98) during March through June 1937.The ratio of deposits to reserves  
changed little immediately following the increases in reserve requirements in March and May, 1937 and, 
in fact,   rose from 4.96 in May 1937 to 5.12 in August 1937. Beginning in August 1937, the ratio began 
to fall once more. Thus, the three increases in reserve requirements occurred during a period in which 
the aggregate ratio of deposits to reserves had already been declining and the changes in reserve 
requirements had no clear short-run impact on  the ratio of deposits to reserves. It is not obvious from 
any simple analysis of the aggregate data, therefore, that the doubling of reserve requirements caused 




The significance of doubling reserve requirements in 1936-37 remains an unsettled question. 
According to Friedman and Schwartz (1963), banks built up substantial reserve balances in excess of 
legal requirements during the Depression as a precaution against bank runs. After 1933, gold inflows 
caused the monetary base to rise, which, according to Friedman and Schwartz (1963), enabled banks to 
satisfy their increased precautionary demand for liquid assets.
1
A number of economists have sided with Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and concluded that the 
hikes slowed the growth of the money stock and contributed to the recession of 1937-38. Chandler 
(1971), for example, concludes that the August 1936 increase “had no visible effect on monetary and 
credit conditions,” but that the subsequent hikes were “a mistake.” According to Chandler (1971, p. 
316), Fed officials believed that the increases in reserve requirements would not induce banks to curtail 
their lending or sell securities, or cause interest rates to rise, but “Their forecasts were wrong…. They 
underestimated member bank demands for excess reserves as a source of liquidity.” Chandler (1971) 
concludes that the recession of 1937-38 probably would have occurred in the absence of the increases 
in reserve requirements, and that the increases alone probably would not have caused a recession, but 
that the increases did contribute to the decline in economic activity. 
 Friedman and Schwartz (1963) argue 
that the increases in reserve requirements in 1936-37 raised the demand for high-powered money 
because they reduced the amount of reserve balances that were available to satisfy a conversion of 
bank deposits into cash.  
Meltzer (2003, p. 503) agrees with Chandler’s view that the increase in reserve requirements in 
August 1936 “had no perceptible effect on the economy in 1936.” However, he notes that as a result of 
the hike, the effective monetary base was 10 percent lower in the second half of 1936 than a year earlier 
                                                           




and that the three hikes in reserve requirements locked up $3.1 billion of reserves that could have been 
used as the basis for money creation (p. 504, 518).  
Frost (1971) suggests a different interpretation than Friedman and Schwartz (1963) for the 
accumulation of excess reserves during the 1930s. Frost (1971) contends that the large accumulation of 
excess reserves in the 1930s reflected movement along a stable demand curve rather than shifts in 
demand associated with banking panics or changes in reserve requirements. Banks held large amounts 
of excess reserves, Frost (1971) argues, because at the very low interest rates that prevailed in the 
1930s, the cost of adjusting reserve positions exceeded the marginal interest earned on other short-
term assets.  
Wilcox (1984) provides some empirical support for Frost’s (1971) hypothesis. Based on a three-
variable VAR model of bank loan volume, investments and excess reserves, Wilcox (1984) finds that 
financial shocks explain only 1 percent of the variation in excess reserves during the Depression, 
whereas the decline in interest rates can account for 80 percent. Further, Wilcox finds that changes in 
reserve requirements had only small and statistically insignificant impacts on bank loans and 
investments, which he contends supports Tobin’s (1966) claim that “raising reserve requirements may 
have been a mistake but it was probably a relatively harmless one.”
2
Cargill and Mayer (2006) investigate the impact of the increases in reserve requirements in 
1936-37 by comparing changes in reserve and loan ratios of Federal Reserve member banks and 
nonmember banks following changes in reserve requirements (which applied only to Fed member 
banks). Non-member banks accounted for a small share of total bank assets in the mid-1930s. As of June 
 
                                                           
2 Calomiris and Wilson (2004) show that, for New York City banks, increases in reserves during the mid-1930s 
reflected banks’ desires to reduce their portfolio risk in response to losses of bank capital. They argue that contrary 
to Friedman and Schwartz, increased reserve demand did not reflect growing risk aversion of banks in response to 
the banking panics of 1931-1933, but rather, loan losses that reduced capital. Mounts, Sowell and Saxena (2000) 
and Lindley, Sowell and Mounts (2001) argue that the accumulation of excess reserves reflected high inventory-




1936, total assets of member and non-member banks was $53.6 billion, of which $46.5 billion was held 
in Fed member banks. Cargill and Mayer (2006) find that increases in reserve requirements were 
followed by increases in the reserves/assets ratios of member banks relative to those of nonmember 
banks, and decreases in the loans/assets ratios of member banks relative to those of nonmember banks. 
The authors conclude, therefore, that the increases in reserve requirements reduced credit supply and 
thereby likely contributed to the decline in economic activity during 1937-38.  
One potential problem with the Cargill and Mayer (2006) interpretation is that it implicitly 
assumes that member and non-member banks had similar intrinsic reserve demands, once one controls 
for the effects of reserve requirements on Fed member banks. That assumption is unlikely to be true. 
Non-member banks were much smaller than member banks, on average. After 1934, in the presence of 
federal deposit insurance, that size difference should have been an important source of difference in 
reserve demand. Small banks tended to have small depositors, and since only deposits of under $5,000 
were covered by deposit insurance, the effective protection offered by deposit insurance varied greatly 
with bank size (Calomiris and White 1994, Calomiris and Wilson 2004). For example, if fundamental 
changes increased the reserve demand associated with uninsured deposits (to mitigate increased 
portfolio risk or depositor liquidity risk), banks that enjoyed deposit insurance protection on all or most 
of their deposits may not have felt as great a need to increase their reserves. Thus, the lesser increase in 
reserve ratios observed by Cargill and Mayer (2006) for non-member banks may simply indicate that 
non-member banks’ fundamental demand for reserves (irrespective of reserve requirements) was less 
sensitive to changes in portfolio risk or liquidity risk. As we show in Figure 4 below, like non-member 
banks, Fed member banks that were located outside of major cities did not exhibit a rise in reserve 




Hanes (2006) investigates the behavior of the yields on longer-term Treasury securities during 
the 1930s to determine how bond yields are influenced by changes in the supply of reserves in an 
environment where the overnight interest rate is effectively at the zero lower bound. Hanes (2006) 
presents a model of reserve demand in which the quantity of reserves demanded by a bank is 
determined by its required minimum balance, the overnight interest rate, the cost of a reserve 
deficiency and the degree of uncertainty about payment flows. The overnight interest rate falls to zero 
when the supply of free reserves (i.e., excess less borrowed reserves) is sufficiently large to ensure that 
a bank will always meet its reserve requirement. Hanes argues that this, in fact, was the case in the mid-
1930s due to the large amount of excess reserves held by banks throughout the period. In that case, 
changes in required minimum reserve balances have no impact on reserve demand (and neither do 
changes in the discount rate or regulations affecting the cost of reserve deficiencies). However, bond 
prices must rise (and yields fall) to induce banks to hold any additional increases in reserve supply, even 
if the overnight rate is zero. Hanes estimates various regressions of weekly changes in bond yields on 
various measures of reserve supply and changes in reserve requirements for April 1934-August 1939. 
Whereas he finds that yields fell in response to increases in total reserves, Hanes (2006) finds that the 
impact of changes in required reserves was insignificantly different from zero. That finding suggests that 
reserve requirements may not have been a binding constraint on reserve demand for most banks. 
One challenge to identifying the effects of the increases in reserve requirements in 1936-37 is 
that they coincided with another monetary policy action—the sterilization of gold inflows which began 
in December 1936 and continued until July 1937. Gold inflows, reflecting political and economic 
disruptions in Europe and Asia, were the principal cause of the rapid growth in bank reserves and the 
monetary base during 1934-36. Treasury officials grew increasingly concerned that gold inflows were 




2003, p. 504). In December 1936, President Roosevelt approved the Treasury’s plan to sterilize further 
inflows, thereby preventing them from increasing aggregate bank reserves.  
Between December 1936 and July 1937, the Treasury sterilized some $1.3 billion of gold inflows 
and total member bank reserve balances rose by just $180 million (Meltzer, 2003, p. 506). The resulting 
decline in the growth of the monetary base is apparent in Figure 1. Hanes’ (2006) evidence suggests that 
the gold sterilization program, and the resulting decline in monetary base growth, was a more important 
cause of higher bond yields and the slowing of economic activity in 1937-38 than the hikes in reserve 
requirements. Friedman and Schwartz (1963, p. 510, p. 544) also conclude that the sterilization program 
“sharply reinforced” and “was no less important” than the hikes in reserve requirements in reducing 
growth of the money stock and causing the recession of 1937-38. 
Hanes (2006) relies on regression identification to measure the effect of the reserve 
requirement changes by examining the significance of time series residuals for a small number of 
observations.  Another way to approach identification, which has the benefit of relying on a larger 
number of observations, is to focus on the microeconomics of individual bank reserve demand. If 
changes in reserve requirements affected the supply of money and credit, it would have been by 
increasing the demand for reserves at Fed member banks (the ratio of reserves to deposits). Our 
empirical strategy is to disaggregate reserve demand and examine the behavior of individual banks and 
groups of banks to determine whether and by how much the reserve requirement increases raised the 
demand for reserves.  
III. Theory and Empirical Methodology 
  Our empirical approach disaggregates the reserve holdings of the banking system to estimate 
reserve demand at the individual bank level, using call report data on Fed member banks for 1934 and 




We then simulate changes in reserve holdings of member banks for 1936-38 to address a counterfactual 
question: Did the level of total reserves held after 1935 vary as one would expect on the basis of the 
estimated model of reserve demand, under the counterfactual assumption of no change in reserve 
requirements? If the observed changes in the reserve holdings of member banks varied as one would 
expect on the basis of fundamentals, unrelated to changes in reserve requirements, that would suggest 
that the changes in reserve requirements had little or no effect on the demand for reserves. 
  More formally, we assume that reserve demand takes the form: 
                          (R/A) unrestricted = Φ(fundamental characteristics) 
(4)     (R/A) demand = Max 
                     (rrD/A) + Є(fundamental characteristics) 
In Equation (4) we express reserve requirements as rrD, where rr is the average reserve requirement 
against a representative mix of deposits. We express reserve demand as the ratio of reserves to assets, 
although in our empirical work we will also consider reserves expressed as a ratio of deposits. Reserves 
can be defined using alternative measures of reserve assets, some defined narrowly and some more 
broadly to include non-cash liquid assets, and we will consider various definitions of reserves in our 
empirical work. Fundamental characteristics that affect reserve demand include various characteristics 
of the bank and the market environment that affect a bank’s decision about the proportion of assets to 
hold in liquid form. These include various influences on the riskiness of loans, withdrawal risks on 
various classes of deposits, and the costs of raising equity capital, which is an alternative way of 
reducing risk of default on deposits (see Calomiris and Wilson 2004). 
  According to Equation (4), and as imagined by Friedman and Schwartz, reserve requirements  




amount of excess reserves demanded (for simplicity, in the aggregate, assume a constant buffer to 
ensure compliance with the requirement) is larger than the amount of reserves that would have been 
demanded in the absence of reserve requirements. An increase in rr that makes [(rrD/A) + Є] binding on 
reserve demand, therefore, will have a contractionary effect on the money multiplier. On the other 
hand, if [(rrD/A) + Є] is always less than Φ, because the amount of reserves desired for fundamental 
reasons unrelated to reserve requirements is relatively large, then changes in reserve requirements 
have no effect on (R/A) and no effect on the money multiplier or the money supply. 
  Our main empirical strategy is to estimate Φ using bank-level data for 1935 and use those 
estimates to simulate the path of (R/A) for 1936-1938. We then compare simulated reserves, actual 
reserves, and required reserves over that time period. To the extent that actual reserves track simulated 
reserves (based on a model of fundamentals) and are unrelated to changes in required reserves in 1936-
1937, that would indicate little role for changes in reserve requirements in causing variation in actual 
reserves. If, instead, actual reserves deviated from simulated reserves and tracked changes in required 
reserves, that would suggest a potential role for changes in reserve requirements in driving reserve 
demand.  
  Three fortuitous aspects of the period 1934-1937 are noteworthy from the standpoint of our 
use of regression results based on December 1934 and December 1935 data to simulate counterfactual 
reserve demand for June 1936 - June 1937. First, interest rates were quite stable throughout the period 
December 1935-June 1937. That is fortuitous because interest rates capture an opportunity cost to 
holding cash reserves, and thus changes in interest rates could affect reserve demand. The Federal 
Reserve Board index of Treasury bond yields (Board of Governors 1976, pp. 469-71) reports the 
following yields for the key call report dates used in this study: December 1935: 2.83 percent; June 




Second, the period December 1935-June 1937 was one of stable economic and financial 
conditions. Reserve demand can increase during times of heightened macroeconomic risk, but economic 
growth was stable during this period and almost no banks failed.  
Third, there were few new entrants into banking during this period. New entrants will tend to 
exhibit higher initial reserve demand, as it takes time for them to develop lending relationships with 
customers. A period of substantial bank entry, therefore, could exhibit significant shifts in reserve 
demand. That potential problem, however, is not relevant during the period 1934-1937. The number of 
country banks that were Fed members was 5,999 in December 1935, and 5,970 in June 1937. The 
number of central reserve city banks in New York City and Chicago was 52 in December 1935 and 50 in 
June 1937. The number of reserve city banks was 336 in December 1935 and 337 in June 1937.  
Before performing a regression analysis and simulation to compare actual and counterfactual 
reserve holdings in 1936 and 1937 to see whether increases in reserve requirements affected reserve 
demand, we first describe the path of actual, required, and excess reserves during the mid-1930s, using 
various alternative definitions of reserves (which exclude or include various components). These 
comparisons offer useful preliminary insights from the perspective of Equation (4) about the extent to 
which required reserves were a binding constraint on total reserve demand in 1936 and 1937. 
IV. Bank Reserve Measures Disaggregated By Type and Location of Bank 
As specified by the Banking Act of 1935, Federal Reserve member banks were required to hold 
balances with Federal Reserve Banks to satisfy their legal reserve requirements. Vault cash and other 
liquid assets could not be used to satisfy minimum reserve requirements.
3
                                                           
3 Significant statutory changes to reserve requirements were last made under the Monetary Control Act of 1980. 
Since then, banks have been able to use vault cash to satisfy their legal reserve requirements. 
 Nonetheless, banks did hold 
substantial liquid assets as “secondary” reserves to meet unexpected payments flows and investment 




Moreover, most banks maintained correspondent balances with banks in other cities, especially in 
central reserve city banks in New York City and Chicago, as well as in banks in other large cities, to 
facilitate interregional payments and commercial transactions. The leading correspondent banks in New 
York City and Chicago held substantial deposits for banks located throughout the country (indeed 
throughout the world). Although such balances did not satisfy legal reserve requirements, they were 
among the most liquid assets of commercial banks.  
The Fed was aware of the substitutability among different categories of reserves. In considering 
whether to increase reserve requirements, Fed officials estimated the number of banks that likely would 
be unable to satisfy an increase in required reserves without selling securities or contracting their 
deposit liabilities. The Fed estimated that as of January 1937, only 197 member banks (out of a total of 
6,367 banks) could not satisfy an increase in reserve requirements by utilizing their excess reserve 
balances or by decreasing their deposits with correspondents by less than 50 percent, and that their 
aggregate reserve deficiency would be only $123 million. Of these banks, 13 were in New York City and 
Chicago, and they accounted for $109 million of the aggregate $123 million estimated deficiency. Thus, 
Fed officials were confident that an increase in reserve requirements would not cause most banks to sell 
securities or reduce their lending, or have a significant impact on interest rates (Chandler, 1971, pp. 316-
17). As Figure 2 shows, in the aggregate, excess reserves were still a significant fraction of bank assets 
even after the increases in reserve requirements in 1936 and 1937; in June and December 1937, the 
ratio of excess reserves to total assets for Fed member banks as a whole had fallen from pre-June 1936 
levels of 5 to 7 percent to levels of 1.8 and 2.6 percent for June 1936 and December 1937, respectively. 
After 1937, excess reserves increased, rising to over 10 percent by 1940.  
Figure 2 also shows semi-annual data on the behavior of various other measures of reserves 




required reserves (using the requirements shown in Table 1) relative to total assets. The measure Res2 
equals balances with the Federal Reserve (i.e., balances that meet statutory reserve requirements) plus 
vault cash, cash items in the process of collection, and balances due from other banks. The measure 
Res3 equals Res2 minus net balances due to other banks. The measures Res6 and Res7 equal Res3 and 
Res2, respectively, plus bank holdings of government securities. All four measures generally rose 
between 1934 and 1940, except between December 1936 and June 1937, when all but Res3 fell. Thus, 
the period encompassing the doubling of reserve requirements (shown by the vertical lines) appears to 
have interrupted temporarily a secular increase in reserve ratios that had begun by 1934. 
Figure 3 plots semi-annual data for 1934-41 on the various measures reserves to total assets for 
central reserve city banks located in New York City. The data show clearly the doubling of the ratio of 
required reserves to assets, and also show corresponding decreases in excess reserves to total assets 
held by New York City banks. The total reserves of New York City banks with the Federal Reserve rose by 
$643 million between June 1936 and June 1937, and their aggregate ratio of reserves at the Fed to total 
assets increased from 0.16 to 0.21. 
Figure 3 also shows the ratios of the four broader measures of reserves to total assets. Because 
New York City banks lost some $220 million of correspondent deposits between June 1936 and June 
1937, the increase in the ratio Res3/assets was larger (in percentage terms) than the increase in reserve 
balances with the Fed to total assets.  
The measures Res6 and Res7 equal Res3 and Res2, respectively, plus bank holdings of 
government securities. New York City banks reduced their holdings of government securities by $1.1 
billion, but increased their loans by $750 million between June 1936 and June 1937. Thus, the changes in 
the balance sheets of New York City banks were consistent with the complaint expressed most strongly 




by selling government securities, which had driven up their market yields, rather than simply by having 
their “excess” reserve balances converted into “required” reserve balances. However, the increase in 
lending by New York City banks is not consistent with Friedman and Schwartz’s view that banks curtailed 
the supply of credit to private-sector borrowers in response to the increase in reserve requirements, at 
least not immediately. New York central reserve city banks were a large part of the banking system; they 
comprised 29 percent of total member assets as of June 1936. Lending by New York City banks did fall 
after June 1937 but, of course, that could have reflected numerous influences, including a decline in 
loan demand during the recession (which began in May 1937), as well as a curtailment of the supply of 
base money as the result of the sterilization of gold inflows. 
Because they held enormous correspondent deposits, the response of New York City banks to 
the increases in reserve requirements may have differed from the response of member banks 
elsewhere. Figure 4 plots the various reserve/assets measures for country member banks, i.e., Federal 
Reserve member banks throughout the country, excluding the central reserve city banks of New York 
and Chicago and the reserve city banks in other major cities. Country banks accounted for 29 percent of 
the total assets of Fed member banks in June 1936. The reserve deposits of country banks with the Fed 
rose 35 percent ($350 million) between June 1936 and June 1937, compared with a 31 percent increase 
for New York’s central reserve city banks. The deposits of country banks with correspondents fell by 
some $200 million. However, the ratios Res2/assets and Res3/assets were essentially flat over time; 
they remained at the same levels in June 1937 as they had been in June 1936. Moreover, country banks 
increased their holdings of government securities by $350 million and their loans by $305 million, and, in 
contrast with New York City banks, the measures Res6/assets and Res7/assets for country banks were 
higher in June 1937 than they had been in June 1936. These patterns are not consistent with the notion 
that the increases in reserve requirements caused a reduction in the money multiplier for the country 




There was also substantial heterogeneity in the behavior of bank balance sheets between June 
1936 and June 1937 across Federal Reserve districts. For example, Figures 5 and 6 show reserve ratios 
for reserve city banks located in the Boston and San Francisco districts, respectively. For Boston district 
reserve city banks, which comprised 3 percent of total Fed member bank assets in June 1936, the 
various reserves/assets measures exhibit substantial declines between June 1936 and June 1937 
(especially between December 1936 and June 1937), particularly the Res2/assets and Res3/assets 
measures. However, the changes in the reserve/assets measures for San Francisco district reserve city 
banks, which accounted for 9 percent of Fed member bank assets in June 1936, are much smaller. 
Moreover, except for the Res6/assets measure, they all increased between June 1936 and June 1937. 
The data disaggregated by class of bank and Federal Reserve district, as well as for different 
measures of liquid to total assets, reveal a more complex picture than is apparent from the aggregate 
“money multiplier” analysis of Friedman and Schwartz (1963). These regional differences are not 
surprising; regionally-disaggregated measures of economic activity (e.g., the number of business 
failures, the value of building permits, or Dun & Bradstreet’s index of economic activity) also reveal 
substantial heterogeneity in economic conditions during the 1937-38 recession.
4
V. Data 
 Next, we investigate 
how well estimates of the demand for bank reserves for various classes of banks and Fed regions based 
on micro data for 1934 and 1935 track actual reserves measures during 1936-38. 
  The data for this study are drawn from two sources. Aggregated data for 1934 through 1941 for 
reserve city banks, by Federal Reserve District, for each of the twelve Fed Districts, and similar data for 
                                                           
4 In regression results not reported here, we replaced Fed district indicator variables (used in Tables 4 and 5) with 
district-level measures of business conditions, business failures, and building permits, and found them significant 
in predicting reserve holdings of Fed member banks. For our simulation purposes, the district indicator variables 
are the more appropriate way to capture cross-sectional differences in the economic environment (as we discuss 




central reserve city banks in New York City, central reserve city banks in Chicago, and non-reserve city 
“country” banks located throughout the United States, are all from the Federal Reserve’s Banking and 
Monetary Statistics, Volume 2 (1943). Bank-level data for all Fed member banks, from call reports for 
December 1934 and December 1935, are from microfilm records of call reports, which were hand-
collected as part of the Calomiris and Mason (2003a, 2003b) data collection effort.  
     The Calomiris and Mason (2003a, 2003b) data set of individual Fed member bank call reports 
ends in 1935. We use individual bank-level data for 1934 and 1935 to estimate reserve demand and 
then apply the estimated coefficients from that model to 1936-1938 data for the 15 mutually exclusive 
aggregates of Fed member banks.  
 Our micro sample consists of data on 6,207 individual Federal Reserve member banks, 5,790 of 
which are country banks, 362 are reserve city banks, and 49 are central reserve city banks. While just 
over 9 percent of the sample consist of reserve city or central reserve city banks, those banks are much 
larger than the country banks, averaging almost $17 million in assets versus just over $1 million in assets 
for country banks. Reserve city and central reserve city banks represent only 9 percent of banks, but 55 
percent of bank assets. The variables used in our regression analysis are defined in Table 2, and 
summary statistics for those variables are given in Table 3. In our analysis, we estimate separate models 
for country banks and for city banks (reserve city and central reserve city banks) since we find important 
differences in the reserve demands of these two categories of banks. Thus, in Table 3, we report 
summary statistics separately for those two groups. There are too few central reserve city banks to 
perform regression analysis separately for that group, but we include two indicator variables to capture 




VI. Estimation Results 
  Calomiris and Mason (2007) develop an empirical model of national bank reserve demand for 
the pre-World War I period, which shows that bank asset composition, liability mix, and bank location 
are significant in predicting cross-sectional variation in bank reserves relative to assets. Calomiris and 
Mason (2003a) develop a model of survival duration for Fed member banks during the period 1929-
1933, in which measures of bank asset and liability mix and risk, as well as conditions in the local 
economic environment, play important roles in explaining the survival of Fed member banks during the 
Great Depression. Calomiris and Wilson (2004) show that the high reserve demand of banks during the 
Great Depression reflected the desire of banks to preserve low default risk on their deposits in the wake 
of large loan losses during the Depression. Banks also cut dividends during the Depression to shore up 
their capital ratios, but few banks raised new capital from external sources, since adverse-selection 
problems in the equity market implied high dilution costs on new offerings. Our model follows all three 
of these studies by allowing the reserve demands of Fed member banks to vary according to their 
location and their asset and liability mix, and conceives of cross-sectional variation in reserve demand as 
reflecting differences across banks in their risk, leverage and liquidity profiles.  
Our goal is to model the fundamentals of reserve demand in the cross section. As of December 
1935, reserve requirements likely were not binding for most banks. Referring to Equation (4), the 
reserve ratios of the vast majority of banks were determined by fundamental demand (the top line in 
the expression).
5
                                                           
5 In results not reported here, we also ran regressions using excess reserve ratios as our dependent variables. Note 
that because required reserves only vary in the cross-section as a function of deposit mix, there will be no 
substantial difference between an empirical model of the cross-section that uses the ratio excess reserves to 
assets as the dependent variable and a similar model that uses the total reserve ratio, if the explanatory model 
includes measures of liability mix, as our model does. Thus, one cannot learn much about the degree to which 
reserve requirements are binding (as described in Equation 4) by comparing the fit of these alternative models. 
Nevertheless, under the assumption that reserve requirements are generally non-binding in December 1935, one 




assets for various reserve concepts. We also ran an analogous set of regressions defining reserve ratios 
using total deposits in the denominator; the results were very similar, although adjusted R-squared is 
consistently higher when using assets as the scaling variable.   
We consider three definitions of reserve ratios in our regressions: res2, res3, and res6. Res2 is a 
narrow, gross concept of reserves (which excludes Treasury securities, but includes deposits at other 
banks); res3 is the same as res2, but subtracts deposits due to other banks when measuring reserves, 
and res6 is a broad, gross measure of the reserve ratio, which adds Treasuries to the res2 measure of 
reserves. We ran but do not report other regression results (res1, res4, res5, and res7), which do not 
differ qualitatively from the results reported here, which vary in which liquid assets are included in the 
definition of reserves. Res1 excludes vault cash, res4 and res5 include Treasury bills but not bonds, and 
res7 includes all Treasuries but excludes deposits held for other banks. 
The financial ratios used in the regressions to capture bank-specific characteristics obviously are 
endogenous variables that reflect bank choices as well as exogenous circumstances. Our models are 
intended to predict reserve demand, so that demand can be simulated for 1936-1937; we do not claim 
to identify the various exogenous structural influences on reserve demand. Our regression model can 
only include measures of bank characteristics in December 1934 and December 1935 that are also 
observed for the various member bank aggregates we analyze in 1936 and 1937. In particular, we 
cannot include in the regression county-level or state-level characteristics that may be relevant for 
reserve demand. The reason is simple: our aggregate measures do not capture shifts over time in the 
relative importance of counties or states within each of those aggregates.  
The regression models in Table 4 are linear, which allows us to map from bank-specific data to 
banking aggregates. As we will discuss, we also consider weighted least squares (WLS) estimated, in 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
would expect the fit of the total reserve specification to be superior, and we do find consistently higher adjusted R-




addition to ordinary least squares (OLS), to permit larger banks (which inherently have greater weight in 
the 1936 and 1937 aggregate data) to also have greater weight when estimating the regression 
coefficients. 
When modeling bank-specific characteristics that predict reserve demand, variables must be 
defined carefully to avoid “mechanical” correlations that result from the structure of balance sheets. For 
example, a model of reserves/assets that uses non-reserves/assets as an explanatory variable would 
achieve an R-squared of 1, since the two concepts are perfectly negatively correlated, but one would 
learn nothing from such a model. The financial ratios employed in the regressions in Table 4, therefore, 
are constructed to avoid such mechanical correlations.  
The current and lagged (December 1934) bank characteristics included as predictors of reserve 
demand in Table 4 fall into three categories: a bank size indicator (the natural logarithm of total assets, 
ln_ta), to capture influences related to size after controlling for other variables, five asset composition 
variables that measure the riskiness and liquidity of assets, and four liability mix variables that capture 
the liability structure of the bank (its leverage and its deposit mix), which are relevant for capturing both 
default risk and liquidity risk. 
Size has no significant effect within the sample of city banks (reserve city and central reserve city 
banks), indicating little effect of economies of scale, per se, within that group. Size enters positively in 
the country bank sample. Larger country banks may have experienced higher risks related either to their 
business strategy or their locations that are otherwise unobservable. 
The construction of the five asset composition variables begins by dividing assets into cash and 
non-cash categories. Cash assets include vault cash, reserves at the Fed, deposits at other banks, 
Treasury securities, and cash items in process of collection. Non-cash assets include everything else, and 




The mix of cash assets should matter for reserve ratios, since some categories (e.g., reserves at 
the Fed) are “better” as cash than others. Reserves at the Fed are more liquid than Treasury securities, 
are immune from interest rate risk, and can satisfy the legal reserve requirement; thus, one would 
expect that, ceteris paribus, banks that hold a higher proportion of Treasury securities relative to total 
cash assets should have to hold more reserves, when reserves are defined broadly to include Treasuries, 
and less reserves when reserves are defined narrowly to exclude Treasuries (since they are substitutes 
for vault cash and reserves at the Fed). That is precisely what the regression results show. The 
coefficient on USgovsec_cashass is negative in the res2 and res3 regressions, and positive in the res6 
regressions. We also include the ratio of vault cash to total cash assets (vaultcash_cashass) to see 
whether vault cash (which did not count toward the legal reserve requirement) and which is not easily 
transferrable to other banks via the depository network, is less valuable as a reserve asset than reserves 
at the Fed or deposits at other banks (the excluded category of cash assets), and we find that it 
consistently enters with the expected negative sign.
6
Loans are a relatively illiquid and risky asset compared with private bonds, and we expect 
loan_noncash to enter positively in all the regressions, which it does. The composition of loans should 
also matter for reserve demand. We lack detailed information about loan composition, but we are able 
to distinguish real estate loans from other loans. The share of real estate loans in total loans 
(realestateloan_loan) is positive and significant for country banks, but insignificant for reserve city and 
central reserve city banks. That result is not surprising, since these likely reflect the larger exposure of 
country banks to agricultural real estate lending. We also attempt to capture variation in the riskiness of 
real estate loans through the ratio of “other real estate owned” (which generally represents foreclosed 
 
                                                           
6 These results have interesting implications for thinking about how to measure aggregate liquidity in the financial 
system. An index of aggregate liquidity that would combine reserves at the Fed, vault cash, and Treasury securities 
would give the greatest weight to reserves at the Fed, and less weight to the other components. Such an index 
could be employed as an alternative to high-powered money or M1 or M2 to measure changes in market liquidity 




real estate) relative to total real estate lending (oreo_realestateloan). That variable is never highly 
significant statistically, but given its potential relevance as a measure of risk, we include it as a predicting 
variable. 
Liability mix is captured by measuring the proportion of debt finance and its composition. We 
capture leverage with net worth relative to total assets (nw_ta); the higher the net worth ratio, the 
lower the leverage, and according to Calomiris and Wilson (2004), the lower should be the demand for 
reserves. As predicted, nw_ta enters with the predicted negative sign. The mix of debt should also 
matter; deposits entail withdrawal risk, especially demandable deposits. The ratio of total deposits 
relative to debt (td_ta-nw) should, and does, enter positively in the regressions, but more for the res2 
and res3 regressions than for the res6 regressions, and more for country banks than reserve city banks. 
Demand deposits due to the public as a proportion of total deposits (dd_td), and deposits due to banks 
as a fraction of deposits (dtb_td), should, and do, enter positively in res2 and res6 regressions (although 
the statistical significance is higher for country banks; for res3 regressions, the sign on dtb_td is 
negative, as one would expect, given that deposits due to banks is subtracted from the numerator of 
res2 to arrive at the res3 measure. 
We also include indicator variables for bank location, which capture both the distinct long-term 
circumstances of different banks’ liquidity needs (e.g., a New York City, or a Chicago, location), as well as 
divergent short-term economic environmental circumstances, which are captured by the Federal 
Reserve District indicator variables. In regression specifications not reported here, we substituted 
measures of macroeconomic performance at the Fed District level (business conditions, business 
failures, and building permits) for the District indicator variables, and we found these measures were 
highly statistically significant. However, these variables also vary greatly over time, and given the cross-




and 1937, including these District-level environmental measures would be problematic since we are 
unable to capture dynamic adjustment to these macroeconomic variables from cross-sectional 
estimates. 
In Section VII we will use estimated values from cross-sectional regressions to simulate the path 
of reserves for 15 mutually exclusive aggregates of Fed member banks (New York City central reserve 
city banks, Chicago central reserve city banks, country banks, and reserve city banks in each of the 12 
Fed districts). Because we will be simulating aggregates rather than individual bank behavior, it is 
appropriate to use weighted least squares (WLS) estimates, which estimate coefficients by weighting 
banks according to their size. Specifically, we experimented with three different weighting approaches. 
First, we weighted banks according to their asset size relative to the total assets of member banks in 
their Fed district. Second, we weighted banks according to their asset size relative to the mean asset size 
of member banks in their Fed district. Third, we weighted banks according to the size of their deposits 
relative to the mean deposit size of member banks in their Fed district. The WLS estimates are quite 
similar in all three approaches, and none of our simulation results or conclusions differs across these 
three different approaches to weighting. We report the WLS results using the second weighting scheme 
in Table 5, and use them in the simulations, since those results exhibited slightly higher adjusted R-
squareds than the other two weighting methods. 
Overall, the results of the WLS results are similar to the OLS results, both for the city banks’ 
sample and the non-city (country) banks, but the WLS and OLS results are more similar for the country 
banks. Several effects for city banks are larger in absolute value and more statistically significant than in 
the OLS specifications, including the coefficients on vaultcash_cashass, loan_noncash, 
realestateloan_loan, dd_td, lag_vaultcash_cashass, lag_loan_noncash, and the indicator variables 




smaller in absolute value and statistical significance, including the coefficients on nw_ta, td_tanw, 
lag_oreo_reloan_ratio, and the indicator variables frdist_dum9 and chicagocity. We conclude that for 
the sample of city banks (which includes some of the largest banks in the country, as well as much 
smaller banks) weighting by bank size affects the WLS results because the behavior of the largest banks 
differs from that of other banks. The changes in the coefficients on nycity and chicagocity are consistent 
with that interpretation. For example, once greater weight is given to larger banks in the sample (which 
tend to be located in New York City and Chicago), larger banks have more influence on estimated 
coefficients for financial ratios, and the changes in financial ratio coefficients eliminate the need for a 
special indicator variable for Chicago.   
Not surprisingly, there are far fewer differences between the OLS and WLS results for the 
country banks sample (which is far more homogeneous in terms of the size and function of the included 
banks). In that sample, the absolute magnitude of lag_USgovdep_td rises, and there is an offsetting 
decline in the absolute value of USgovdep_td. Two other effects are also substantially reduced in the 
WLS results: lag_USgovsec_cashass and frdist_dum3.  
VII. Simulated Reserve Demand, 1936-1937 
  Using the coefficients from our res3 WLS estimates in Table 5, along with data for the balance 
sheet ratios and location characteristics of banks for June and December calls in 1936-1938, we simulate 
res3 demand for the 15 mutually exclusive aggregates of Fed member banks. We report results here 
only for the res3 reserve measure, but the results for res2 and res6 simulations are broadly similar. We 
report res3 results because these should be relatively favorable to the Friedman-Schwartz hypothesis 
because res3 is our narrowest measure of reserves.  
For each of the 15 aggregates, Figure 7 plots simulated res3 (proj) and actual res3 (Res3_Ta) on 




res3) against the path of the ratio of required reserves relative to total assets (Reqres_Ta) on the right 
side of each panel. The plots show that, for the most part, proj tracks Res3_Ta well. And, more 
importantly, the forecast errors are not consistent with a story in which increased reserve requirements 
caused increases in reserve ratios that would not otherwise have happened.  A model based entirely on 
information about reserve demand fundamentals from December 1935 would have predicted the rising 
demand for reserves that occurred in 1936-1938, to the extent that there were increases.  
Table 6 reports the relative size of each of the 15 aggregates plotted in Figure 7. The Figure 
displays three sets of patterns over the key period of June 1936 to June 1937, during which the reserve 
requirement increases took effect, none of which is consistent with the view that reserve requirement 
increases caused increases in reserve ratios. In six of the 15 cases, representing 20.7% of the assets of 
Fed member banks, from June 1936 to June 1937 res3 ratios actually fell (for New York District reserve 
city banks, Boston District reserve city banks, Cleveland District reserve city banks, Chicago central 
reserve city banks, Chicago District reserve city banks, and Minneapolis District reserve city banks). 
Clearly, the declines in reserve ratios for these five aggregates are inconsistent with the Friedman-
Schwartz view, since the actual change in the ratio of reserves to assets was negative. In another three 
of the 15 cases, representing 33.0% of member bank assets (country banks,  Dallas District reserve city 
banks, and Kansas City District reserve city banks) the changes in actual reserve ratios were essentially 
zero, and in all of those cases, projected increases exceeded actual increases. In the remaining six cases, 
representing 46.3% of member bank assets (New York central reserve city banks, Philadelphia District 
reserve city banks, Richmond District reserve city banks, Atlanta District reserve city banks, St. Louis 
District reserve city banks, and San Francisco District reserve city banks) reserve ratios increased from 




In none of the 15 cases did we observe a rise in reserve ratios coinciding with a negative residual (a case 
when projected increases under-forecast actual).
7
An important point that these diverse patterns of reserve demand demonstrate is that the 
overall increase in aggregate reserve demand during the mid-1930s was driven by a subset of city banks. 
As our simulations show, country banks’ reserve demands remained flat because the fundamental 
determinants of their reserve demands did not prompt them to increase their reserves. Indeed, Cargill 
and Mayer’s (2006) findings that compared non-member banks to Fed member banks are better 
understood as a comparison between, on the one hand, smaller member and non-member country 
banks – which, as a group did not increase their reserve demand – and on the other hand, city banks – 
which as a group, increased their reserve demand. The difference between city banks and country banks 
reflected different fundamental influences on reserve demand and not increases in reserve 
requirements, which is further illustrated by the fact that the increase in city banks’ reserve demands 
did not occur for city banks in all locations.  
 
VIII. Conclusion 
  The Federal Reserve doubled reserve requirements in three stages in 1936 and 1937 in an 
attempt to remove “slack” from the banking system and to put itself in the position of being able to 
tighten the money supply through open market sales or further reserve requirement increases if 
deemed necessary. The Fed did not believe that the higher reserve requirements reduced the supply of 
money or credit in 1936 and 1937. Friedman and Schwartz (1963) challenged that view and argued that 
the higher reserve requirements raised reserve demand, thereby lowering the money multiplier and 
                                                           
7 Note that the starting points of the actual and projected res3_ta ratios in December 1935 are not the same. This 
reflects the fact that in the individual bank regressions actual bank size is used, but in applying the estimated 
coefficients to the aggregates, we cannot observe the distribution of banks’ size, and so use average bank size 
instead. This introduces a difference between the level of projected and actual reserves, but should not have any 




contracting the supplies of money and credit. Subsequent studies have both supported and contested 
that view. 
  Ours is the first study to examine reserve demand directly at a disaggregated level to see if Fed 
member banks actually increased their reserve demands in response to the increases in reserve 
requirements. We use microeconomic data on Fed member banks from 1934 and 1935 to model reserve 
demand, and find that various alternative measures of demand are highly predictable as a function of 
bank-specific and location characteristics.   
Based on the model estimated using data from the 1934 and 1935, when reserve requirements 
clearly were not a binding constraint on bank reserve demand, we simulate reserve demand for 1936-
1938 for 15 mutually exclusive aggregates of Fed member banks (New York City central reserve city 
banks, Chicago central reserve city banks, reserve city banks in each of the 12 Fed Districts, and country 
banks located in smaller cities and towns). We find that to the extent that banks increased their reserve 
ratios during the period of reserve requirement increases, the increases in reserve demand between 
June 1936 to June 1937 reflected predictable influences related to the structure of the banks, and not 
increases in reserve requirements imposed by the Fed. This evidence lends support to the Fed’s 
interpretation of the effects of the reserve requirement increases, and casts doubt on the view that the 
doubling of reserve requirements caused the recession of 1937-1938. Other policy actions, especially 
reduced monetary base growth (due to the December 1936 sterilization of gold flows) and the 1936 tax 
rate increases, seem more likely culprits in causing the recession.  
There are important lessons from the experience of the mid-1930s for monetary policy today. 
U.S. banks now hold huge amounts of excess reserves. Total excess reserves in the banking system total 




1930s, these reserves are not “superfluous” balances; rather, they are held intentionally by banks as 
ways of stabilizing their asset portfolios, reducing their risk and improving their liquidity.  
As bank profits and loan opportunities increase, and as macroeconomic risks recede, banks will 
reduce excess reserves to finance loan expansion. Still, the shedding of excess reserves is unlikely to be 
uniform across the banking system; just as in the 1930s, changes in reserve preferences likely will 
display substantial heterogeneity across banks. Without an understanding of the microeconomic 
foundations of the shifting demand for reserves, policy makers may be caught flat-footed when the 
demand for reserves changes. A major reduction in reserve demand for even two of the largest banks in 
the system could imply substantial expansion of money and credit.  
Some Fed officials have advocated raising interest payments on excess reserves to prevent too 
rapid a contraction of excess reserves and increase in lending as reserve-demand preferences shift. That 
approach may work, but its efficacy is limited by the ability of the Fed to gauge the interest elasticity of 
reserve demand and raise interest rates accordingly. And, of course, the extent of feasible interest rate 
increases on reserves may be limited by the Fed’s need to maintain its own solvency. Clearly, the ability 
to understand and anticipate changes in reserve demand preferences will be key to the successful 
implementation of monetary policy in the coming years. 
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Figure 2  
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Figure 7: Actual and Projected Reserves Measures for Various Classes of Banks 





























































Figure 7: Actual and Projected Reserves Measures for Various Classes of Banks 
 































































Table 1. Member Bank Reserve Requirements, June 21, 1917 - December 31, 1941  
(Percent of Deposits) 
Class of Deposits and Bank  June 21, 1917 - 
Aug. 15, 1936 
Aug. 16, 1936 - 
Feb. 28, 1937 
Mar. 1, 1937 - 
Apr. 30, 1937 
May 1, 1937 - 
Apr. 15, 1938 
Apr. 16, 1938 - 
Oct. 31, 1941 
Nov. 1, 1941 - 
Dec. 31, 1941 
On net demand deposits:             
Central reserve city  13  19.50  22.75  26.00  22.75  26.00 
Reserve city  10  15.00  17.50  20.00  17.50  20.00 
Country  7  10.50  12.25  14.00  12.00  14.00 
              
On time deposits:             
All member banks  3  4.50  5.25  6.00  5.00  6.00 
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1943). Banking and Monetary Statistics, 1914-41. Washington, DC. 
 
 




Table 2.  Variable Definitions 
 
Variable  Definition 
res2_ta   =( total cash reserve / total asset) = (reserve with FED + Cash and Due From Banks) / total asset 
res3_ta   = (net total cash reserve / total asset) = (reserve with FED + Cash and Due From Banks - Due to 
Banks) / total asset 
res6_ta   = (reserve with FED + Cash and Due From Banks + USGovernment Securities Owned) / total asset 
ln_ta   = log (Total Asset) 
USgovsec_cashass   = USGovernment Securities Owned / Cash Asset
b 
vaultcash_cashass   = Vault Cash / Cash Asset 
loan_noncash   = Loans and Discounts / Non-Cash Asset
c 
realestateloan_loan   = Real Estate Loan
d / Loans and Discounts 
oreo_reloan_ratio   = Real Estate Owned Other Than Banking House / Real Estate Loan 
nw_ta   = Net Worth
e / Total Asset 
td_ta-nw   = Total Deposits / (Total Asset - Net Worth) 
dd_td   = Demand Deposits / Total Deposits 
dtb_td   = Due to Banks / Total Deposits 
USgovdep_td   = US Government Deposits / Total Deposits 
lag_ln_ta   = lag of ln_ta 
lag_USgovsec_Cashass   = lag of USgovsec_cashass 
lag_vaultcash_cashass   = lag of vaultcash_cashass 
lag_loan_noncash   = lag of loan_noncash 
lag_realestateloan_Loan   = lag of realestateloan_loan 
lag_oreo_reloan_ratio   = lag of oreo_reloan_ratio 
lag_nw_ta   = lag of nw_ta 
lag_td_ta-nw   = lag of td_tanw 
lag_dd_td   = lag of dd_td 
lag_dtb_td   = lag of Dtb_Td 
lag_USgovdep_td   = lag of USgovdep_td 
frdist_dum2   = 1 if the bank is located in New York, 0 otherwise 
frdist_dum3   = 1 if the bank is located in Philadelphia, 0 otherwise 
frdist_dum4   = 1 if the bank is located in Cleveland, 0 otherwise 
frdist_dum5   = 1 if the bank is located in Richmond, 0 otherwise 
frdist_dum6   = 1 if the bank is located in Atlanta, 0 otherwise 
frdist_dum7   = 1 if the bank is located in Chicago, 0 otherwise 
frdist_dum8   = 1 if the bank is located in St. Louis, 0 otherwise 
frdist_dum9   = 1 if the bank is located in Minneapolis, 0 otherwise 
frdist_dum10   = 1 if the bank is located in Kansas City, 0 otherwise 
frdist_dum11   = 1 if the bank is located in Dallas, 0 otherwise 
frdist_dum12   = 1 if the bank is located in San Francisco, 0 otherwise 
nyCity   = 1 if the bank is located in New York City 




Table 2.  Variable definitions (Cont’d) 
a required reserve 
 = net demand deposit
f × 0.13 + time deposit × 0.03     for central reserve city banks 
 = net demand deposit × 0.1 + time deposit × 0.03     for reserve city banks 
 = net demand deposit × 0.07 + time deposit × 0.03     for country banks 
b cash asset   = USGovernment Securities Owned + Reserve with Fed + Cash and Due From Banks + Outside Checks 
and Other Cash Items 
 
c non-cash asset   = total asset - cash asset 
 
d Real Estate Loan   = Real Estate Loans, Mtgs, Deeds of Trust, and Other Liens on Real Estate on Farm Land + Real Estate 
Loans, Mtgs, Deeds of Trust, and Other Liens on Other Real Estate 
 
e Net Worth   = Capital + Surplus + Net Undivided Profits + Reserves for Dividends or Contingencies 
 
f net demand deposit   = Due to Banks + Demand Deposits + US Government Deposits - Due from Banks
g - Outside Checks 
and Other Cash Items 
 
g Due from Banks   = DFB and Trust Companies in New York City + Due from Member Banks and Trust Companies in 
Chicago for 1934 + Due from Banks and Trust Companies Elsewhere in US + Due from Non-member 
Banks and Trust Companies in New York for 1934 + Due from Non-member Banks and Trust 
Companies in Chicago for 1934 + Due from Non-member Banks and Trust Companies Elsewhere in US 




 Table 3. Summary Statistics 
Reserve-city Banks 
           
Country banks 
          Variable  N  Min  Max  Med  Mean  Std 
 
Variable  N  Min  Max  Med  Mean  Std 
res2_ta  411  0.0341  0.7200  0.2944  0.3024  0.1156 
 
res2_ta  5688  0.0418  0.9414  0.2383  0.2692  0.1408 
res3_ta  411  -0.4326  0.6017  0.1560  0.1571  0.1377 
 
res3_ta  5688  -0.4381  0.8758  0.2152  0.2478  0.1395 
res6_ta  411  0.0341  0.9082  0.5571  0.5500  0.1523 
 
res6_ta  5688  0.0604  0.9562  0.4248  0.4310  0.1599 
ln_ta  411  12.7070  21.5447  16.4354  16.6356  1.6120 
 
ln_ta  5688  11.2240  18.8303  13.7038  13.8245  1.0737 
USgovsec_cashass  411  0.0000  0.8489  0.4526  0.4385  0.1707 
 
USgovsec_cashass  5688  0.0000  0.8963  0.3740  0.3715  0.2079 
vaultcash_cashass  411  -1.7456  0.7974  0.1213  0.1374  0.1382 
 
vaultcash_cashass  5688  -2.7145  0.7371  0.0855  0.1040  0.0909 
loan_noncash  411  0.0437  1.2151  0.6257  0.6113  0.1719 
 
loan_noncash  5688  0.0299  1.8507  0.5715  0.5705  0.1859 
realestateloan_loan  411  0.0000  1.0000  0.1006  0.1738  0.1971 
 
realestateloan_loan  5688  0.0000  0.9366  0.1935  0.2277  0.1708 
oreo_reloan_ratio  411  0.0000  1.0000  0.0801  0.1701  0.2322 
 
oreo_reloan_ratio  5688  0.0000  1.0000  0.0730  0.1401  0.1923 
nw_ta  411  0.0363  0.4950  0.1056  0.1180  0.0508 
 
nw_ta  5688  0.0000  0.8159  0.1400  0.1517  0.0594 
dd_td  411  0.0000  0.9707  0.4823  0.4876  0.1565 
 
dd_td  5688  0.0000  1.0000  0.4467  0.4807  0.2278 
USgovdep_td  411  0.0000  0.3156  0.0125  0.0335  0.0487 
 
USgovdep_td  5688  0.0000  0.6625  0.0020  0.0274  0.0591 
td_tanw  411  0.3891  1.0220  0.9495  0.9305  0.0758 
 
td_tanw  5688  0.3284  1.0549  0.9131  0.8926  0.0848 
dtb_td  411  0.0000  0.8274  0.1341  0.1745  0.1624 
 
dtb_td  5688  0.0000  0.7812  0.0104  0.0284  0.0495 
lag_ln_ta  411  12.6218  21.3728  16.3112  16.5120  1.6291 
 
lag_ln_ta  5688  10.8553  18.7885  13.6431  13.7719  1.0693 
lag_USgovsec_cashass  411  0.0000  0.8792  0.4606  0.4522  0.1728 
 
lag_USgovsec_cashass  5688  0.0000  0.9173  0.4618  0.4509  0.1857 
lag_vaultcash_cashass  411  -1.7692  0.8007  0.1098  0.1326  0.1373 
 
lag_vaultcash_cashass  5688  -38.8341  0.7242  0.0798  0.0844  0.5466 
lag_loan_noncash  411  0.0057  0.9986  0.6298  0.5987  0.1729 
 
lag_loan_noncash  5688  0.0305  1.1077  0.5821  0.5752  0.1836 
lag_realestateloan_loan  411  0.0000  0.9999  0.0968  0.1780  0.2059 
 
lag_realestateloan_loan  5688  0.0000  0.9750  0.1829  0.2205  0.1694 
lag_oreo_reloan_ratio  411  0.0000  1.0000  0.0684  0.1429  0.1969 
 
lag_oreo_reloan_ratio  5688  0.0000  1.0000  0.0618  0.1327  0.1892 
lag_nw_ta  411  0.0448  0.4984  0.1191  0.1303  0.0568 
 
lag_nw_ta  5688  0.0000  0.7563  0.1430  0.1540  0.0591 
lag_dd_td  411  0.0000  0.9359  0.4604  0.4726  0.1576 
 
lag_dd_td  5688  0.0000  1.0000  0.4305  0.4654  0.2302 
lag_USgovdep_td  411  0.0000  0.4785  0.0367  0.0585  0.0681 
 
lag_USgovdep_td  5688  0.0000  0.6939  0.0058  0.0386  0.0686 
lag_td_tanw  411  0.3602  1.0927  0.9295  0.9110  0.0831 
 
lag_td_tanw  5688  0.2790  1.0000  0.8579  0.8425  0.0924 
lag_dtb_td  411  0.0000  0.8018  0.1241  0.1601  0.1542 
 
lag_dtb_td  5688  0.0000  0.7687  0.0095  0.0268  0.0477 




Table 4. OLS regressions for individual banks in December 1935 
Sample  Reserve City Banks     Non-Reserve City Banks 
Dependent Variable  res2_ta  res3_ta  res6_ta        res2_ta  res3_ta  res6_ta    
constant  0.2810***  0.3657***  0.2877**  
 
0.1664***  0.1908***  0.0356    
  (0.075)  (0.079)  (0.129)    
 
(0.027)  (0.027)  (0.038)    
ln_ta  -0.0097  -0.0076  -0.0356    
 
0.0533***  0.0530***  0.0898*** 
 
(0.043)  (0.046)  (0.064)    
 
(0.013)  (0.013)  (0.017)    
USgovsec_cashass  -0.4650***  -0.4547***  0.1602*** 
 
-0.2871***  -0.2867***  0.2153*** 
 
(0.037)  (0.040)  (0.057)    
 
(0.011)  (0.011)  (0.014)    
vaultcash_cashass  -0.0655**  -0.0623**  -0.0833**  
 
-0.1993***  -0.1978***  -0.2553*** 
 
(0.027)  (0.028)  (0.041)    
 
(0.053)  (0.053)  (0.071)    
loan_noncash  -0.0297  -0.0323  0.0391    
 
0.0694***  0.0682***  0.1294*** 
 
(0.052)  (0.051)  (0.086)    
 
(0.018)  (0.018)  (0.023)    
realestateloan_loan  -0.0621  -0.0552  -0.1477*   
 
0.1099***  0.1100***  0.1483*** 
 
(0.052)  (0.051)  (0.083)    
 
(0.020)  (0.020)  (0.030)    
oreo_reloan_ratio  -0.0130  -0.0109  -0.0052    
 
0.0113  0.0105  0.0105    
 
(0.023)  (0.023)  (0.036)    
 
(0.012)  (0.012)  (0.016)    
nw_ta  -0.7655***  -0.6894**  -1.3170*** 
 
-0.3685***  -0.3310***  -0.4743*** 
 
(0.263)  (0.276)  (0.379)    
 
(0.058)  (0.058)  (0.077)    
td_tanw  0.1607*  0.0460  0.0116    
 
0.0961***  0.0722***  0.0706**  
 
(0.086)  (0.090)  (0.138)    
 
(0.024)  (0.024)  (0.033)    
dd_td  0.1790  0.1761  0.1794    
 
0.2173***  0.2192***  0.2957*** 
 
(0.126)  (0.130)  (0.201)    
 
(0.028)  (0.028)  (0.037)    
dtb_td  0.1732  -0.6519***  0.2611    
 
0.2130***  -0.5417***  0.2689*** 
 
(0.151)  (0.158)  (0.240)    
 
(0.054)  (0.054)  (0.074)    
USgovdep_td  0.0833  0.0818  -0.0251    
 
-0.0982***  -0.0996***  -0.1230*** 
 
(0.153)  (0.167)  (0.253)    
 
(0.031)  (0.031)  (0.043)    
lag_ln_ta  0.0074  0.0058  0.0345    
 
-0.0484***  -0.0482***  -0.0813*** 
 
(0.043)  (0.046)  (0.064)    
 
(0.013)  (0.013)  (0.017)    
lag_USgovsec_cashass  0.1224***  0.1109***  0.2108*** 
 
-0.0398***  -0.0399***  -0.0231    
 
(0.038)  (0.039)  (0.063)    
 
(0.010)  (0.010)  (0.014)    
lag_vaultcash_cashass  0.0006  -0.0023  0.0072    
 
-0.0001  -0.0002  0.0002    
 
(0.026)  (0.026)  (0.039)    
 
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)    
lag_loan_noncash  0.0286  0.0299  -0.0302    
 
-0.0557***  -0.0557***  -0.1058*** 
 
(0.052)  (0.052)  (0.086)    
 
(0.018)  (0.018)  (0.023)    
lag_realestateloan_loan  0.0735  0.0651  0.0802    
 
-0.0827***  -0.0827***  -0.1222*** 
 
(0.049)  (0.049)  (0.074)    
 
(0.020)  (0.020)  (0.030)    
lag_oreo_reloan_ratio  0.0402*  0.0470*  0.0527    
 
-0.0153  -0.0152  -0.0196    
   (0.024)  (0.025)  (0.040)        (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.015)    
 




Table 4. OLS regressions for individual banks in December 1935 (Cont’d) 
Sample  Reserve City Banks     Non-Reserve City Banks 
Dependent Variable  res2_ta  res3_ta  res6_ta        res2_ta  res3_ta  res6_ta    
lag_nw_ta  0.2004  0.1932  0.4958    
 
0.0685  0.0663  0.0390    
 
(0.243)  (0.253)  (0.352)    
 
(0.053)  (0.053)  (0.071)    
lag_td_tanw  -0.0467  -0.0428  -0.0158    
 
-0.0217  -0.0255  0.0050    
 
(0.082)  (0.083)  (0.133)    
 
(0.023)  (0.023)  (0.031)    
lag_dd_td  0.0165  0.0332  0.0617    
 
0.0075  0.0066  0.0349    
 
(0.124)  (0.128)  (0.195)    
 
(0.028)  (0.028)  (0.037)    
lag_dtb_td  0.0562  0.0291  0.0485    
 
-0.0354  -0.0424  0.0341    
 
(0.149)  (0.154)  (0.231)    
 
(0.052)  (0.053)  (0.075)    
lag_USgovdep_td  -0.0458  -0.0339  -0.1216    
 
0.0404  0.0412  0.0607    
 
(0.127)  (0.141)  (0.198)    
 
(0.028)  (0.028)  (0.040)    
frdist_dum2  -0.0247  -0.0307  -0.0706*   
 
0.0076*  0.0055  0.0029    
  (0.027)  (0.029)  (0.039)    
 
(0.004)  (0.005)  (0.007)    
frdist_dum3  0.0045  0.0050  -0.0017    
 
-0.0096**  -0.0125***  -0.0298*** 
  (0.023)  (0.024)  (0.034)    
 
(0.005)  (0.005)  (0.007)    
frdist_dum4  0.0237  0.0239  0.0349    
 
0.0179***  0.0152***  0.0367*** 
  (0.024)  (0.025)  (0.036)    
 
(0.005)  (0.005)  (0.008)    
frdist_dum5  0.0330  0.0312  0.0679*   
 
0.0247***  0.0216***  0.0389*** 
  (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.037)    
 
(0.006)  (0.006)  (0.008)    
frdist_dum6  0.0261  0.0308  0.0550    
 
0.0793***  0.0755***  0.1224*** 
  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.037)    
 
(0.008)  (0.008)  (0.010)    
frdist_dum7  0.0598**  0.0606**  0.1140*** 
 
0.0380***  0.0352***  0.0758*** 
  (0.025)  (0.026)  (0.037)    
 
(0.006)  (0.006)  (0.009)    
frdist_dum8  0.0112  0.0097  0.0077    
 
0.0307***  0.0268***  0.0527*** 
  (0.024)  (0.025)  (0.036)    
 
(0.007)  (0.007)  (0.010)    
frdist_dum9  0.0854**  0.0939**  0.1109**  
 
0.0352***  0.0317***  0.0616*** 
  (0.036)  (0.037)  (0.052)    
 
(0.007)  (0.007)  (0.010)    
frdist_dum10  0.0574**  0.0545**  0.0900*** 
 
0.0621***  0.0589***  0.0888*** 
  (0.024)  (0.025)  (0.035)    
 
(0.008)  (0.008)  (0.011)    
frdist_dum11  0.0616**  0.0615**  0.1196*** 
 
0.0522***  0.0483***  0.0711*** 
  (0.024)  (0.025)  (0.035)    
 
(0.009)  (0.009)  (0.011)    
frdist_dum12  0.0264  0.0281  0.0207    
 
0.0303***  0.0279***  0.0502*** 
  (0.026)  (0.027)  (0.038)    
 
(0.007)  (0.007)  (0.010)    
nycity  0.0228  0.0178  0.0429    
          (0.025)  (0.026)  (0.035)    
        chicagocity  0.0486*  0.0409  0.1290*** 
          (0.027)  (0.028)  (0.038)    
        N  411  411  411        5688  5688  5688    





Table 5. WLS regressions for individual banks in December 1935 
Sample  Reserve City Banks     Non-Reserve City Banks 
Dependent Variable  res2_ta  res3_ta  res6_ta        res2_ta  res3_ta  res6_ta    
constant  0.2734***  0.4326***  0.0961        0.2603***  0.3256***  0.1697**  
  (0.069)  (0.077)  (0.119)    
 
(0.045)  (0.050)  (0.074)    
ln_ta  0.0278  0.0261  0.0308    
 
0.0622***  0.0531***  0.0990*** 
 
(0.042)  (0.044)  (0.066)    
 
(0.015)  (0.017)  (0.026)    
USgovsec_cashass  -0.5599***  -0.5597***  0.1113**  
 
-0.3291***  -0.3328***  0.1865*** 
 
(0.038)  (0.042)  (0.055)    
 
(0.015)  (0.016)  (0.024)    
vaultcash_cashass  -0.2054***  -0.2004**  -0.3112*** 
 
-0.2949***  -0.3034***  -0.4174*** 
 
(0.077)  (0.079)  (0.113)    
 
(0.040)  (0.041)  (0.059)    
loan_noncash  0.0639  0.0527  0.2192*** 
 
0.0835***  0.0811***  0.1527*** 
 
(0.055)  (0.051)  (0.081)    
 
(0.023)  (0.026)  (0.037)    
realestateloan_loan  -0.1125*  -0.1183**  -0.2344*** 
 
0.0929***  0.0888***  0.1346*** 
 
(0.059)  (0.059)  (0.090)    
 
(0.023)  (0.024)  (0.043)    
oreo_reloan_ratio  -0.0090  -0.0060  -0.0083    
 
0.0018  -0.0039  -0.0046    
 
(0.015)  (0.016)  (0.030)    
 
(0.017)  (0.017)  (0.028)    
nw_ta  -0.3603  -0.2576  -0.8955**  
 
-0.3983***  -0.3458***  -0.6541*** 
 
(0.251)  (0.233)  (0.363)    
 
(0.075)  (0.076)  (0.144)    
td_tanw  0.0628  -0.1296  -0.1058    
 
0.0125  -0.0579  -0.0319    
 
(0.094)  (0.096)  (0.154)    
 
(0.031)  (0.040)  (0.050)    
dd_td  0.2202*  0.2492*  0.2437    
 
0.1655***  0.1596***  0.2499*** 
 
(0.131)  (0.131)  (0.225)    
 
(0.042)  (0.042)  (0.065)    
dtb_td  0.0684  -0.7348***  0.0510    
 
0.2490***  -0.5952***  0.4425*** 
 
(0.163)  (0.169)  (0.282)    
 
(0.068)  (0.077)  (0.113)    
USgovdep_td  -0.0429  -0.0080  -0.2158    
 
0.0105  0.0022  0.0639    
 
(0.151)  (0.158)  (0.293)    
 
(0.040)  (0.040)  (0.072)    
lag_ln_ta  -0.0232  -0.0215  -0.0212    
 
-0.0560***  -0.0459***  -0.0887*** 
 
(0.042)  (0.044)  (0.066)    
 
(0.015)  (0.017)  (0.026)    
lag_USgovsec_cashass  0.1514***  0.1432***  0.3016*** 
 
-0.0137  -0.0140  0.0155    
 
(0.039)  (0.042)  (0.063)    
 
(0.015)  (0.015)  (0.026)    
lag_vaultcash_cashass  0.0228  0.0219  0.0110    
 
-0.0005  -0.0007  -0.0009    
 
(0.015)  (0.016)  (0.024)    
 
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)    
lag_loan_noncash  -0.0719  -0.0681  -0.2329*** 
 
-0.0773***  -0.0788***  -0.1471*** 
 
(0.052)  (0.049)  (0.083)    
 
(0.025)  (0.028)  (0.040)    
lag_realestateloan_loan  0.0743  0.0688  0.0981    
 
-0.1133***  -0.1133***  -0.1885*** 
 
(0.054)  (0.055)  (0.084)    
 
(0.023)  (0.024)  (0.044)    
lag_oreo_reloan_ratio  0.0096  0.0087  0.0127    
 
-0.0110  -0.0080  -0.0240    
   (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.031)        (0.016)  (0.015)  (0.026)    
 




Table 5. WLS Regressions for Individual Banks in December 1935 (Cont’d) 
Sample  Reserve City Banks     Non-Reserve City Banks 
Dependent Variable  res2_ta  res3_ta  res6_ta        res2_ta  res3_ta  res6_ta    
lag_nw_ta  -0.1740  -0.1167  -0.0782    
 
0.0047  0.0036  -0.0255    
 
(0.239)  (0.221)  (0.349)    
 
(0.071)  (0.073)  (0.125)    
lag_td_tanw  0.0230  0.0381  0.1490    
 
0.0001  -0.0147  0.0173    
 
(0.081)  (0.077)  (0.137)    
 
(0.031)  (0.033)  (0.052)    
lag_dd_td  0.0062  -0.0191  0.1295    
 
0.0314  0.0368  0.0772    
 
(0.126)  (0.124)  (0.216)    
 
(0.039)  (0.040)  (0.062)    
lag_dtb_td  0.0892  0.0234  0.2266    
 
-0.0316  0.0031  -0.0681    
 
(0.165)  (0.171)  (0.281)    
 
(0.070)  (0.085)  (0.121)    
lag_USgovdep_td  -0.0229  -0.0436  0.0198    
 
-0.0800**  -0.0815**  -0.1474**  
 
(0.127)  (0.135)  (0.219)    
 
(0.039)  (0.039)  (0.066)    
frdist_dum2  -0.0330  -0.0415*  -0.1119*** 
 
0.0067  0.0070  0.0009    
  (0.026)  (0.024)  (0.042)    
 
(0.007)  (0.007)  (0.012)    
frdist_dum3  -0.0207  -0.0213  -0.0347    
 
0.0060  0.0028  -0.0023    
  (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.037)    
 
(0.006)  (0.006)  (0.011)    
frdist_dum4  0.0091  0.0069  0.0358    
 
0.0210***  0.0198***  0.0391*** 
  (0.022)  (0.021)  (0.039)    
 
(0.006)  (0.006)  (0.010)    
frdist_dum5  0.0253  0.0225  0.0753**  
 
0.0292***  0.0275***  0.0432*** 
  (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.038)    
 
(0.007)  (0.007)  (0.013)    
frdist_dum6  0.0262  0.0272  0.0534    
 
0.0565***  0.0540***  0.1017*** 
  (0.023)  (0.024)  (0.040)    
 
(0.009)  (0.009)  (0.014)    
frdist_dum7  0.0524***  0.0533***  0.1008*** 
 
0.0407***  0.0390***  0.0840*** 
  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.037)    
 
(0.007)  (0.007)  (0.013)    
frdist_dum8  0.0002  -0.0052  -0.0045    
 
0.0298***  0.0214**  0.0445*** 
  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.039)    
 
(0.008)  (0.010)  (0.012)    
frdist_dum9  -0.0103  -0.0041  -0.0409    
 
0.0465***  0.0435***  0.0739*** 
  (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.049)    
 
(0.010)  (0.010)  (0.016)    
frdist_dum10  0.0394*  0.0338  0.0534    
 
0.0611***  0.0584***  0.0767*** 
  (0.023)  (0.022)  (0.040)    
 
(0.009)  (0.010)  (0.014)    
frdist_dum11  0.0385*  0.0401*  0.0813*   
 
0.0572***  0.0545***  0.0675*** 
  (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.041)    
 
(0.011)  (0.010)  (0.016)    
frdist_dum12  -0.0265  -0.0246  -0.0722*   
 
0.0318***  0.0310***  0.0487*** 
  (0.022)  (0.021)  (0.039)    
 
(0.009)  (0.009)  (0.013)    
nycity  -0.0286  -0.0293  -0.0703**  
          (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.035)    
        chicagocity  0.0131  0.0127  0.0315    
       
 
(0.023)  (0.023)  (0.041)    
        N  411  411  411        5688  5688  5688    






Table 6. Relative Size of Fifteen Districts 
Regional district  total asset  relative size 
Country Member Banks  13389  0.2878 
Dallas reserve district  757  0.0163 
San Francisco reserve district  4028  0.0866 
Minneapolis reserve district  515  0.0111 
Kansas City reserve district  1201  0.0258 
Chicago reserve district  1698  0.0365 
St. Louis reserve district  926  0.0199 
Richmond reserve district  894  0.0192 
Atlanta reserve district  808  0.0174 
Philadelphia reserve district  1563  0.0336 
Cleveland reserve district  2516  0.0541 
Boston reserve district  1319  0.0284 
New York reserve district  424  0.0091 
Chicago central reserve city  3162  0.0680 
New York central reserve city  13324  0.2864 
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